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While innovation is the hallmark of the information technology (IT) industry, very little research 
has studied individuals motivation toinnovate either as scientists in research and development 
(R&D) departments of established firms, or as entrepreneurs startingtheir own ventures. In this 
research, we develop a game theoretic model based on theories of human capital and information 
asymmetry to explore how individuals’ skill levels impact their decision on whether to work for 
established companies or become entrepreneurs. Our results suggest that if information about 
individuals’ skills is private information, then highly skilled individuals choose to become 
entrepreneurs. In the presence of imperfect signaling, employees with very high skills or very low 
skills tend to work in established companies, and those with intermediate skills become 
entrepreneurs. We also find that entrepreneurs, on average, have higher skill levels than 
scientists, and increased technology risks raises the mass of scientists in the market.  
. 
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Who is the quintessential IT entrepreneur - Gordon Moore or Bill Gates? The two men could not be more different 
in their educational backgrounds. Moore had a PhD in Chemistry and Physics, whereas Bill Gates dropped out of 
undergraduate college. Yet both men proved themselves as innovators par excellence by establishing two highly 
successful companies (Intel and Microsoft respectively). Their story raises a very interesting question: what is the 
role of signals of individual ability such as education in creating successful IT innovators? 
Innovation is the cornerstone of the information technology (IT) industry. The rapid change in technology provides 
opportunities for the creation of new product and obsolescence of existing products. Two main types of individuals 
are at the forefront of innovation in IT – one, researchers working in established companies (henceforth labeled 
‘scientists’ in this paper), and entrepreneurs (henceforth labeled ‘entrepreneurs’) who create new products in newly-
formed establishments which is symbolic of the garage startup culture of Silicon Valley. Ceteris paribus, one would 
expect that highly skilled individuals would choose to become entrepreneurs since the monetary rewards of 
entrepreneurship are generally greater than those of working in an established company. However, the industry is 
also rife with instances of pioneers with very little formal education such as Bill Gates, Larry Ellison, and Michael 
Dell who founded very successful IT companies. Studies have shown mixed results on the link between human 
capital indicators such as education and entrepreneurship. For example, Wadhwa et al (2008) show that 31% of 
technology entrepreneurs have a masters degree and that they come from a wide assortment of schools (both ivy 
league, first and second tier schools). In short, there is ambiguity in the role of human capital on individuals’ choice 
to become entrepreneurs vis-à-vis conducting research in established firms in the IT industry.  
Several studies have written about the role of human capital in Information Technology (IT) firms (Ang et al, 2002; 
Mithas and Krishnan, 2007). These studies have mainly explored the value that IT firms perceive for employees’ 
human capital indicators such as education and experience. Banker et al (2009) suggest that employees with higher 
levels of education have a significant impact on R&D productivity of IT firms. While these issues are clearly 
important, they are mainly relevant to employees who choose to work in established firms. Few studies have 
analyzed the role of skill in the motivation of IT professionals to indulge in entrepreneurial ventures. This is 
surprising considering that IT industries are well known for a culture of entrepreneurship, where individuals choose 
to forgo the benefits and security of working in established firms for the uncertainty of joining a start-up or setting 
up a start-up of their own. With this motivation, we propose our main research question as follows: what is the role 
of skills in individuals’ decision to become entrepreneurs vis-à-vis scientists in established firms? How does the 
ability of individuals to signal human capital through objective measures such as education or standardized test 
scores impact the equilibrium? 
We propose this study in the context of IT producing industries
1
. This includes IT hardware and software firms 
whose main objective is to develop new products for the market. Examples include established companies such as 
Microsoft, Cisco, and Intel, as well as startup companies such as Xintronix (www.xintronix.co.uk), and Tabula 
(www.tabula.com). While product designers (entrepreneurs and scientists) are responsible for creating new products, 
yet another set of professionals complete the innovation cycle in IT industries – ‘production engineers’ working for 
IT manufacturing organizations such as Flextronics which bring the new products designs to fruition in form of 
manufactured integrated circuits (IC). For simplification, we assume that the entire eco-system of IT producers 
comprises of three types of professionals – scientists, entrepreneurs, and production engineers.  
We set up an occupational choice model where agents have the above three occupational choices - they choose a 
research career either with as scientists running a corporate-sponsored research venture at a large firm, or as 
entrepreneurs starting an independent research venture.  Alternately, the agents may choose a non-research career as 
a ‘production engineers’. It is generally accepted that research based activities such as product design and innovation 
require more creativity, whereas production is more of a routine job with well defined descriptions. We assume that 
agents are risk-averse, and are endowed with a skill factor that determines one’s average productivity at performing 
research. In the process of innovating, agents are subject to an uninsurable idiosyncratic shock.  Employers observe 
the aggregate output of their operations, but not the individual skills of a researcher.  
                                                          
1 While other IT firms (such as IT services, software services providers) are an essential part of the IT industry, we exclude these from our 
discussion for simplicity 
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Our main results are as follows: we show that if skill is private information, low-skilled agents become production 
engineers, those of intermediate ability become scientists, and high-skilled agents become entrepreneurs. On the 
other hand, if skill is public information, high skilled agents become scientists and low skilled agents become 
production engineers; no individual chooses to become an entrepreneur. We also consider the case where employers 
observe a noisy signal of ability, such as education or experience, and compensate employees based on the 
observable signal of ability. We show that in equilibrium, high-skilled agents sort as follows: those with fairly 
accurate signals become scientists; those that are underrated by the signal become entrepreneurs; and those with low 
signal become production engineers. Our results suggest that the presence of a noisy signal is essential for 
entrepreneurs to exist in the market - if the signal is not sufficiently noisy, all high skills agents choose to become 
scientists. The paper contributes to literature on human capital and IT by examining the role of individual skills in 
employees’ decision to self select into different job types within the IT industry.  
Literature Review 
Recent research in MIS literature has focused on the role of human capital in IT firms. Ang et al (2002) show that 
employers in the software industry in Singapore reward education and work experience of employees with high 
compensation. Levina and Xin (2007) extend these results to the context of IT employers based in the US. Slaughter, 
Ang and Boh (2007) suggest that the relation between human capital and compensation is moderated by the firm-
specificity of the human capital. Banker et al (2008) suggest that educated employees are associated with higher 
R&D productivity in IT firms. Recent research has also examined the role of training in IT firms (Ramasubbu et al., 
2008).  
Research in labor economics and strategic management has examined individual’s motivation to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities, and the results are mixed. Lazaer (2005) summarizes the different facets of the argument 
as follows: on one hand, we would expect creative and skilled individuals to pursue entrepreneurship. On the other 
hand, it is also likely that entrepreneurs are workers who cannot find regular job (or have no other alternatives), and 
could come from the lower half of the ability distribution. Blanchflower and Meyer (1991) pointed out that research 
concerning entry into an entrepreneurial (or managerial) occupation has focused on the following assumptions 
[Kanbur (1982), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979), Grossman (1984)].  First, profitable business opportunities are 
feasible for all individuals, yet most simply choose not to exploit them.  Second, entrepreneurs receive the same 
expected utility as they would as workers.  Third, the entrepreneur is likely to be someone with unusually low risk-
aversion (as in Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979).  On the other hand, classical literature on the topic such as Kirzner 
(1973), Knight (1921), and Schumpeter (1939) argue that attitude to risk is not the central characteristic that 
determines who becomes an entrepreneur.   
Recent literature on entrepreneurship has highlighted the importance of individual ability and other factors such as 
propensity for risk, gender, social background, education and intelligence as significant predictors of entrepreneurial 
talent (van Praag and Cramer, 2001). Fraser and Greene (2006) suggest that experience also plays a role in 
individual’s choice to become an entrepreneur.    
 Our work differs from past literature in the following ways: one, while prior studies consider the tradeoff between 
entrepreneurial returns and fixed wages, we consider an additional option – that of a scientist where a firm provides 
insurance by pooling risk across several individuals and compensating them based on the group output (which is 
different from fixed wages). Two, we consider different types of information – full information case, no information 
case,, and incomplete information case - and model how individuals’ propensity to choose an occupation depends on 
the type of information revelation.  
Prior literature also points out the difference in pay structure between startups and established companies. Stafford 
(1980, p. 334) pointed out that “a larger establishment can provide insurance functions … if the different jobs 
(occupations) or individuals within the plant are subject to earnings uncertainty.”  Medoff and Abraham (1980) find 
only a weak link between pay and performance in large firms.  In accordance with these observations, the large 
research firm provides full insurance to its employees in the form of a fixed wage, as in Holmstrom (1983).  
Gompers (1999), Bullock (1983), and Kozmetsky et al (1985) showed that research-intensive start-ups are typically 
funded by venture capitalists; moreover, they usually hold an equity stake instead of using debt.   
Model 
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In every period, a continuum of mass one of risk-averse agents is born, whereby an agent is indexed by a skill level s 
that is drawn from a distribution F with support ),0[ ∞ .  Skill is private information, though we shall also consider 
the full information case.  Agents live for one period and become an entrepreneur, scientist, or production engineer.  
Entrepreneurs create and run independent ventures financed by risk-neutral venture capitalists. Venture capitalists 
are endowed with the know-how and investment technology to start-up a small firm, so entrepreneurs cannot initiate 
an independent venture on their own.
2
  Scientists run corporate-sponsored ventures at a large research firm.  A 
production engineer earns the exogenous wage w. For simplification, we make the following assumption: the large 
research firm offers fixed wage contracts, whereas the venture capital firm offers equity based contract. This 
assumption is not critical, and if we relax this assumption and allow firms to offer different types of contracts, we 
find that in equilibrium, only the fixed-wage contract of the large firm is accepted, while only the equity-based 
contracts of venture capitalists are accepted.  No agent accepts an equity-based contract from the large firm due to 
the lemons problem.     
Independent ventures and corporate-sponsored ventures develop schematics for new goods, each of which generates 
the payoff AP .  The firm employing the inventor of a schematic obtains an infinitely lived patent, the rights to 
which are then sold to a monopolist that produces the good at constant marginal cost.  It is assumed the firm 
employing the inventor is the full residual claimant to the rent generated by the innovation.  The actual inventor 
receives either a wage (as a scientist) or a share of the returns (as an entrepreneur).   
Each agent is endowed with an innovation technology.  When x units of capital are invested in an agent of skill s, 
she invents 
δε −1)( xs  new goods, where )(sε  is an uninsurable idiosyncratic shock (“productivity”) whose 
distribution depends on s.  The timing is such that the idiosyncratic shock is realized after the investment has been 














sdFsdFsS εε  denote the average productivity of agents in the set ),0[ ∞⊂S . 
An individual with skill level s that chooses a research-based occupation (i.e. by becoming a scientist or 
entrepreneur) incurs the disutility ))(( sdu .  For convenience, the disutility has the same functional form u as that 
over consumption, and it enters preferences in an additive fashion; that is, the utility of a scientist or entrepreneur 
with skill s consuming c is equal to ))(()( sducu − .  The disutility of performing research is decreasing in skill, 
such that 0)( <′ sd .   
Preferences, technology, and the skill distribution satisfy the following throughout the paper: 










cu , where c is consumption and 0>σ . 
(A2) The average productivity of an agent )(sε  is strictly increasing in skill s, and 0)0( ≡ε . 








 is strictly increasing in skill s. 
Assumption (A2) states that, holding the level of investment and state of technology constant, a highly skilled 
individual invents a greater number of schematics for new goods on average.  Moreover, note that (A4) follows 
directly from (A2), since the expected value of a monotone transform of a variable is a monotone transform of the 
expected value. 
The Corporate-Sponsored Venture 
                                                          
2 In a dynamic context, in which an independent venture operates over multiple periods, this is akin to imposing that only venture capitalists have 
access to the capital markets, thus being able to borrow sufficient funds to launch a firm. 
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The large research firm operates a collection of ventures, each of which is run independently by a scientist.  Let Γ  
denote the set of skills of the agents who choose to become scientists.  Being unable to observe skill, the large firm 
has no control over the characteristics of its employees, so it takes Γ  as given.  To construct the equilibrium, it is 
assumed the firm is endowed with rational expectations (perfect foresight); that is, it accurately predicts the set Γ  in 
equilibrium.  Because the firm cannot distinguish its employees, it invests the same amount x in each corporate-
sponsored venture.  Let v denote the wage paid scientists, which is taken as given by the firm in a competitive 














Γ−=Γ δεδ APx . 
There is free entry into the research sector, so the large firm makes zero expected profits in equilibrium yielding an 





Γ−=Γ − δδδ εδδ APv .  
The Independent Venture 
Consider a venture capitalist that is paired with an entrepreneur of skill s to form an equity contract.  Let Ω  denote 
the set of entrepreneurs, which is taken as given by venture capitalists.  As was assumed for the large research firm, 
venture capitalists are endowed with rational expectations; that is, they accurately predict the set Ω  in equilibrium.  
A venture capitalist makes an investment k in exchange for a share α  of the revenues.  There are many venture 
capitalists bidding for each equity contract, so the entrepreneur decides the values of α  and k.  Letting u denote an 









εα , subject 
to the condition that the venture capitalist is willing to enter into the equity contract.  Since the venture capitalist 
must make this decision prior to the realization of the shock without knowing the skill of the entrepreneur, and she is 
risk neutral, the participation constraint (PC) is 0)( 1 ≥−Ω − kkPA
δεα .  The following lemma describes the 
solution to this problem.  
LEMMA 1: Suppose the utility function is strictly increasing.  Then the share of revenues that accrues to the 
venture capitalist is δα −=1 .  Moreover, for any given set ),0[ ∞⊂S , an independent venture utilizes the same 
investment policy as a large firm, )()( SxSk = .  
The lemma states that the entrepreneur chooses a share of revenues that accrue to the venture capitalist equal to 
δα −=1 .  Recall that if the venture capitalist invests x in the venture, then the entrepreneur invents δε −1)( xs  
new goods.  Hence, the coefficient δ−1  represents the (percentage) contribution towards the innovative process 
made by the investment.  As δ  converges to zero, the venture capitalist must become the full residual claimant of 
the investment to ensure his participation. 
The Occupational Choice Decision 
First, we consider the case where skills is private information, and the firm can only infer the distribution of skills 
available in the market.  
PROPOSITION 1 (The Separating Equilibrium): Assume skill is private information.  Define UNŝ  and UNs  
according to 
(3) 




wsdssP UNUNUNA ; 
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In equilibrium, agents choose the following occupations: those in the skill range )ˆ,0[ UNs  become production 
engineers; those in ),ˆ[ UNUN ss  become scientists; and those in ),[ ∞UNs  become entrepreneurs. 
In equilibrium, a positive mass of agents sorts into each occupation in the following fashion. High-skilled agents 
become entrepreneurs, those of intermediate ability become scientists, and the lowest skilled segment of the 
population chooses the occupation of production engineers. The intuition of this outcome is straightforward.  
Because ability is private information, scientists are paid on the basis of their average product.  Therefore, agents 
with sufficiently high skill levels are drawn away from the large research firm since they are not compensated an 
amount commensurate with their productivity.  Only such agents can earn a high expected income as entrepreneurs, 
so they are willing to bear a fraction of the risk associated with running an independent venture.  Because the large 
research firm provides its employees with full insurance, there is a positive mass of agents who choose to become 
scientists since agents are risk averse, which leads us to the next point.  
The presence of the idiosyncratic shock is crucial to the existence of the separating equilibrium. If the innovation 
technology is deterministic, then no agents become scientists because of the “lemons” problem.  The large firm 
would no longer provide insurance functions, so there is no incentive for a researcher to remain with the large firm 
when skill is unobservable and there is no idiosyncratic risk. This observation is also interesting considering that IT 
innovations are characterized by high levels of risk and uncertainty – which explains why R&D operations of 
companies such as Intel and Cisco find a steady supply of scientists to hire. 
The Full Information Case 
Next, we consider the case where skill is observable to employers, in which case agents are paid their marginal 
product at the large research firm while receiving the benefits of full insurance.   
PROPOSITION 2 (The Pooling Equilibrium): Assume skill is public information, and agents are risk averse.  
Define ŝ  according to  
(5) 




In equilibrium, agents choose the following occupations: those in the skill range )ˆ,0[ s  become production 
engineers, and those in ),ˆ[ ∞s  become scientists.  There are no entrepreneurs. 
It follows that, due to risk aversion, no agent has an incentive to become an entrepreneur.
3
  Because the marginal 
product of a researcher is strictly increasing in skill by definition, and scientists incur a disutility of performing 
research that is strictly decreasing in skill, the equilibrium consists of a unique cutoff skill level below (above) 
which agents become production engineers (scientists, respectively).   
Combining this result with Proposition 1, we infer information asymmetries between innovators and their investors 
are required to generate a positive mass of entrepreneurs.  We previously found that, in the absence of idiosyncratic 
risk, no agents become scientists when skill is private information.  Hence, in the presence of both unobservable 
skill and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, scientists and entrepreneurs can coexist.
4
     
The following corollary establishes that UNUN sss << ˆˆ , implying fewer agents become employed by the research 
sector when skill is observable.   
COROLLARY OF PROPOSITION 2: The separating equilibrium relates to the pooling equilibrium as follows: 
UNUN sss << ˆˆ . 
                                                          
3 In fact, if agents are risk neutral, they are precisely indifferent between becoming an entrepreneur versus scientist. 
4 If there is no risk and skill is observable, then individuals are indifferent between becoming scientists versus entrepreneurs. 
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Some basic comparative statics may be performed to deduce how the mass of agents in each occupation depends on 
the fundamental parameters of the model.  The cutoff ŝ  is strictly increasing in the interest rate.  If r rises, the 
payoff per innovation falls, lowering the wage of scientists.  Being a scientist thus becomes less attractive, implying 
more agents become production engineers instead.   
So far, we have analyzed the bipolar cases in which skill is either public or private information.  In the former case, 
no individuals choose to become entrepreneurs since they are paid their marginal product at a large firm.  In the 
latter case, highly skilled individuals are paired with venture capitalists offering equity contracts, while individuals 
of intermediate ability become scientists, earning a fixed wage which proxies for full insurance.  In both cases, low-
skilled agents become production engineers since choosing a research-based occupation entails a loss of utility that 
is decreasing in skill.  Next, we consider the intermediate case of imperfect information, wherein individuals know 
their true skill level, but employers observe a noisy signal of skill.  For example, education, work experience, and 
standardized examinations are typically observable, but these are not a perfect indicator of ability. In markets with 
incomplete information, signals such as education are commonly used as an indicator of one’s ability (Spence, 
1973). 
 
Model with Imperfect Information 
Suppose employers observe a test score t instead of the actual skill s of an agent.  All agents are required to take the 
test prior to employment, and they know their own skill level.  Employers (corporate and venture capitalists) 
consider an agent’s test score as a measure of her expected skill level.  That is, if x is invested in an agent with test 
score t, she is expected to invent 
δε −1)( xt  new goods.  The test score takes on the functional form st ⋅=η , where 
η  is a random variable with support ),0[ ∞  and a distribution T that does not depend on skill and is i.i.d. across 
agents.   
Corporate Sponsored Research 
Consider a corporate-sponsored venture run by a scientist who obtained the test score t.  Let )(tv  denote the wage 
schedule of scientists mapped according to their test score, which is taken as given by the large research firm in the 






δε .  The FOC with 





−= δεδ tPtx A .   







)(max)( .  Due to constant returns, this condition is equivalent to requiring that the typical 
large firm make zero expected profits in equilibrium.  Hence, we equate the marginal cost of hiring a scientist who 
obtained the test score t with his expected marginal product: 
δε −′=′ 1)()()( txtPtv A .  Applying the investment 
policy function, we obtain the expression 
11 )1()]()1)[(()(
−− −−′=′ δδδ εδε ttPtv A .  Integrating this from zero to t, 




−−−−= δδδ εδδ tPtv A .  
Consider an agent with test score t and skill s who becomes an entrepreneur by entering into an equity contract with 
a venture capitalist.  Because an agent knows his own skill level, the objective remains the same, except for having 









.  The participation constraint 
(PC) of the venture capitalist must reflect the fact that she only observes the test score of the entrepreneur.  Hence, 
the PC is given by 0)( 1 ≥−− kktPA
δεα .  The first-order conditions are identical to those derived in Lemma 1, 
whereby )(Ωε  is replaced by )(tε , yielding δα −=1  and )()( txtk = . 
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The Occupational Choice Decision 
The following proposition states the equilibrium.  Subsequent corollaries describe the sorting of agents according to 
their skill level and test score. 
PROPOSITION 3 (The Signaling Equilibrium): Assume employers observe a test score st ⋅=η , the 
idiosyncratic innovation shock is 
δεε ss ⋅=)( , with }{εε E≡  and ),0[ ∞∈ε , and the distribution T of η  is 



































In equilibrium, agents choose the following occupations: those in the set }}1,)min{(ˆ:),{( 1 δηηηη −≤ tss  
become production engineers; those in }}ˆ,max{:),{( tsss ηηη >  become scientists; and those in 
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Figure 1 is a graphical depiction of the equilibrium in ),( sη  space. Employee skill s is plotted on the X-axis, and 
η  is plotted on the Y-axis. R1 – R6 represents different regions of equilibriums based on these parameters. The line 
ηη =  describes the point of indifference between an entrepreneur and scientist.5  The function )(1 sη  describes 
the point of indifference between a production engineer and scientist.  Finally, the function )(2 sη  describes the 
point of indifference between a production engineer and entrepreneur.  Figure 1 is read as follows: all agents to the 
left and below both curves )(1 sη  and )(2 sη  become production engineers; all agents above the line ηη =  and to 
the right of )(1 sη  become scientists; and all agents below the line ηη =  and to the right of )(2 sη  become 
entrepreneurs.  Define a high-skilled agent as one with a skill level above 
1ˆ −ηt .  Agents with ηη ≤  are referred 
to as underrated because 1<η  by Jensen’s inequality; that is, employers undervalue their true worth. Thus regions 
R1 and R2 represent scientists, R3 and R4 represent production engineers, and R5 and R6 represent entrepreneurs. 
The proposition demonstrates that, depending on their realized value of η , high-skilled agents may choose any of 
the three occupations, while low-skilled agents become production engineers or scientists.  A low-skilled agent that 
did not test well, having obtained a test score below t̂ , becomes a production engineer, while a low-skilled agent 
with a test score above t̂  becomes a scientist.  A high-skilled agent with ηη >  becomes a scientist, while an 
underrated high-skilled agent becomes a production engineer or entrepreneur.  An extremely underrated high-skilled 
agent, having obtained 
δδ ηη −− ≤ ts ˆ1 , becomes a production engineer.  An underrated high-skilled agent that did 
not perform so poorly, having obtained 
δδ ηη −− > ts ˆ1 , becomes an entrepreneur.  We may think of η  as an 
allowable margin of error in the signal to not choose the occupation of entrepreneur.  If the distribution T is 
truncated such that no realizations of η  are below η , then no agents become entrepreneurs, so the signal must be 
sufficiently noisy to have a positive mass of entrepreneurs. 
IT firms compensate their employees on the basis of verifiable qualifications, which corresponds with the test score 
in our model (Ang et al, 2002).  The higher an individual’s test score, the more productive she is expected to be, so 
the wage schedule of a scientist is increasing in his test score, according to (7).  If a high-skilled agent performed 
well on the test, then the market, and in particular the large research firm, values highly her (expected) innovative 
contribution.  Hence, if his test score is sufficiently close to his skill level, or exceeds it, then she strictly prefers to 
become a scientist instead of an entrepreneur since agents are risk averse.  A high-skilled agent that performed 
terribly on the test will get a low wage offer from the large research firm, so she rules out the occupation of scientist.  
Indeed, if she was unlucky, the wage offer is so low that she is better off as a production engineer instead of a 
scientist.  Furthermore, because venture capitalists undervalue the contribution of an unlucky high-skilled agent, 
they would invest a low amount in her independent venture.  The occupation of entrepreneur is thus also 
unattractive, so such an agent becomes a production engineer.  An unlucky high-skilled agent that did not perform 
so poorly on the test becomes an entrepreneur as long as the venture capitalist invests a sufficient amount in her 
venture. Corollary 1 of Proposition 3 outlines the sorting of agents across occupations on the basis of their skill 
level.   
COROLLARY 1 OF PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the assumptions stated in Proposition 3 hold. Consider an agent 
with skill level 
1ˆ −> ηts .  The higher  his skill level, the more likely she is to become an entrepreneur and less 
likely she is to become a production engineer, while the probability that she becomes a scientist remains unchanged 
and positive (since sη  and sη  both grow).  Consider an agent with skill level 1ˆ −≤ ηts .  The higher  his skill 
level, the more (less) likely she is to become a scientist (production scientist, respectively), while no agents in that 
range become entrepreneurs.  
A direct implication of the corollary is that the average skill of entrepreneurs (averaged over the noise in the signal) 
exceeds that of scientists, which in turn exceeds that of production engineers, as occurred in the separating 
equilibrium.  Corollary 2 of Proposition 3 describes the sorting process in terms of the test score.     
                                                          
5 The cutoff η  should not be confused with the mean of η , which we have not explicitly defined. 
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COROLLARY 2 OF PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the assumptions stated in Proposition 3 hold.  Consider an agent 
with test score tt ˆ> .  The higher  his test score, the more (less) likely she is to become a scientist (entrepreneur, 
respectively), while no agents in that range become production engineers.  Consider an agent with test score tt ˆ≤ .  
The higher  his test score, the more (less) likely she is to become an entrepreneur (production engineer, 
respectively), while no agents in that range become scientists. 
This suggests that overall, agents with high skill levels are more likely to become entrepreneurs, while those with 
high test scores are more likely to become scientists. The cutoff t̂  has numerous interpretations.  For example, 
suppose attaining the test score t̂  is equivalent to having a PhD or other advanced degree, such that individuals with 
test scores below t̂  do not have an advanced degree.  Suppose, the higher an individual’s test score in excess of t̂ , 
the more famous (or reputable) is the graduate program she attended.  According to Figure 1, no production engineer 
has an advanced degree.  Some individuals without an advanced degree become entrepreneurs, but they must be 
highly skilled (specifically having a skill level in excess of 
1ˆ −ηt ).  Among individuals with an advanced degree, 
the more reputable is the granting institution, the more likely they are to be hired by a large firm [Corollary 2 of 
Proposition 3].  However, a select group of highly skilled individuals with advanced degrees become entrepreneurs.  
They tend to be individuals that attended slightly less reputable institutions, or those that went to top graduate 
programs, but have exceptionally high skill levels.  
Comparative Statics 
The following corollary predicts the impact changes in η  have on the signaling equilibrium when ε  is distributed 
uniformly.  The cutoff η  in Proposition 3 solely depends on the fundamental parameters of the model, including 
the idiosyncratic shock distribution and the coefficient of relative risk aversion.     
COROLLARY 3 OF PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the assumptions stated in Proposition 3 hold.  An increase in η  
raises the mass of entrepreneurs, while lowering that of scientists and production engineers.  If the idiosyncratic 
shock ε  is distributed uniformly over ]2,[ 00 εε − , where 10 0 <≤ ε , then η  rises in response to either of the 
following: a decrease in the variance of the idiosyncratic shock (i.e. a rise in 0ε ), or a decrease in the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion σ .   
The above corollary establishes that a decrease in the variance of the idiosyncratic shock, such that performing 
research is less risky, leads to a rise (fall) in the mass of entrepreneurs (scientists, respectively), as does a decrease in 
risk aversion.  When agents are not very risk averse, or the idiosyncratic shock is not highly volatile, the 
entrepreneurial occupation is not as risky as that of a scientist, so it becomes relatively more attractive if one has a 
sufficiently high skill level.  
It is not possible to predict how the mass of entrepreneurs versus scientists varies with the signal to noise ratio.  
When the signal becomes less noisy, the large research firm pays its employees an amount that is more highly 
correlated with their true skill level, which we call the “income effect.”  As such, the occupation of scientist 
becomes more attractive, implying more agents should choose that occupation instead of pursuing a more risky, 
entrepreneurial venture.  Venture capitalists are also endowed with imperfect information, investing in entrepreneurs 
on the basis of their test score.  Hence, as the signal becomes less noisy, venture capitalists invest an amount that is 
more aligned with an entrepreneur’s true marginal product, which we call the “investment effect.”  Whether the 
investment effect supersedes the income effect depends on the parameters of the model. 
Conclusions 
In this research, we explore the motivation of professionals to self select into different occupational choices in the IT 
industry.  In the context of an occupational choice framework, our approach emphasized the role of two features: 
researchers face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and their ability is private information.  In equilibrium with private 
information, the most able researchers sort into an entrepreneurial, risky occupation, while those of intermediate 
ability prefer the benefits of full insurance at a large firm.  When employers observe a noisy signal of ability, such as 
test scores, large firms employ individuals with a greater educational attainment, while highly skilled individuals 
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who are not able to obtain high test scores choose to become entrepreneurs. We also show that entrepreneurs, on 
average, have higher skills than scientists. Our results suggest that individuals from reputable institutions are more 
likely to be hired as scientists; hence entrepreneurs may come from a crop of extremely talented individuals from 
lower ranked schools. Entrepreneurs can come from top schools as well, but these tend to be the exceptionally bright 
students. Finally, we show that increased uncertainty and risk in innovation leads to more individuals choosing to 
become scientists.  
Our model examines the phenomenon that industrial leadership positions are often held by people with less 
prestigious academic achievement and shed light on its possible causes. An implication of our model is that if the 
innovation technology is deterministic and skills are unobservable, no agents become scientists.  Any scientist with a 
skill level above the average at the large firm would prefer starting up his own venture since, without idiosyncratic 
risk, insurance is not needed. Therefore, idiosyncratic risk is necessary for a vibrant corporate sponsored research 
sector to exist. Understanding the motivations of individuals to become entrepreneurs or scientists can benefit 
managers and policy makers alike. For example, by understanding that test scores and other signals may not 
represent skills perfectly, employers can complement these with additional measures of employee skills such as pre-
employment testing. Moreover, firms should offer some pay-for-performance incentives to attract skilled people 
who would otherwise become entrepreneurs; however, offering only performance based compensation to scientists 
is not optimal since this creates the classical ‘market for lemons’.  
The results of this research need to be understood in view of some limitations. Our model examines occupation 
choice under different signal types considering heterogeneity in individual ability, ignoring other personality traits 
that shape an individual’s desire to be an entrepreneur. Moreover, the three tiered employment structure – 
entrepreneurs, scientists, and production engineers simplifies the actual industry structure where many different 
kinds on people play different roles. But overall, the paper captures the interaction among the underlying variables 
such as skills, research productivity, and efficiency of test scores in such a way that the parsimoniousness of the 
model does not compromise much in terms of the insights gained. Future research can extend our model to consider 
a multidimensional scenario where individuals differ on more than one dimension such as environment and risk 
aversion. Future research can also shed additional light on issues raised in the paper. For example, survey based 
research can uncover whether there are systematic differences between IT professionals whose test scores reflect 
their true skills, as compared to those whose test score are a noisy indicator of skills.  
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Define 
δεα −−≡ 1)()1()( ksPsy A  as the income of an entrepreneur with skill s, and let λ  denote the multiplier 
associated with the PC.  The first-order condition (FOC) with respect to α  is )()]}([)({ Ω=′ ελε syusE , and 





















P AA . 
Since 0)( ≥Ωε , if the utility function is strictly increasing, we have that 0)( >′usε , implying the multiplier λ  
must be positive, such that the PC binds, leading to 
1)]([ −− Ω= εαδ APk .  Plugging this into the FOC with respect 























.  From the FOC with respect to α , the right-hand side of 




Ω−=Ω δεδ APk , yielding the second statement of the lemma.   
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The utility of a scientist is given by 
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εδδ .   
Using the results δα −=1  and )()( SxSk =  for all ),0[ ∞⊂S , the expected utility of an entrepreneur with 

















.   
Suppose agents choose their occupations as hypothesized, such that ),ˆ[ UNUN ss=Γ  and ),[ ∞=Ω UNs .  









cu , we find that an agent with skill s strictly prefers to become an 




















































 is strictly increasing in s, such that the expected utility of an entrepreneur is strictly 
increasing in skill.  Hence, by virtue of (4), all agents with skill levels above the cutoff UNs  so-defined strictly 
prefer to become entrepreneurs instead of scientists.   









εδδ  exceeds )(wu .  By construction, an individual with skill UNŝ  










cu , and setting the utility of a scientist equal to that of a production engineer, we thus obtain (3).  
Individuals with skill levels above UNŝ  strictly prefer becoming scientists versus production engineers since the 
disutility of doing research is decreasing in skill. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Let )(sv  denote the wage schedule of scientists mapped according to their skill.  The firm maximizes the expected 










−= δεδ sPsx A .  The wage schedule must be such that no scientist can earn a higher salary at another 






)(max)( .  Equating the marginal cost of hiring a scientist of skill s with 
his marginal product, we obtain 










ssPsv A .  Integrating this expression from zero to s, and using the fact that 0)0( =v  








εδδ sPsv A . 
The objective of an entrepreneur remains unchanged: 
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εα .   
However, the participation constraint (PC) of the venture capitalist must now reflect the fact that she can observe the 
entrepreneur’s skill, so it becomes 0)( 1 ≥−− kksPA
δεα .  The first-order conditions are identical to the previous 
ones, whereby )(Ωε  is replaced by )(sε .  As long as the utility function of an agent is strictly increasing, it 




−= δεδ sPsk A , so the large firm and 
venture capitalists use the same investment policy.  
We begin by showing that no agents become entrepreneurs because they strictly prefer the occupation of scientist. 









εδδ  exceeds 
))((]})()()1[({ 1 sdusksPuE A −−
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.  Because agents 
are risk averse by hypothesis, we may assume their utility function is strictly concave.  By Jensen’s inequality, 


















That is, at all skill levels, an agent strictly prefers being a scientist instead of an entrepreneur.  This occurs because 
venture capitalists give entrepreneurs their marginal product (on average) so that risk aversion pushes them to 
become scientists in large firms. 
Now we show that all agents above ŝ  become scientists, and all those below become production engineers.  An 









εδδ  exceeds )(wu .  The skill level ŝ  at which an individual is indifferent 










Under (A2) and (A3), )(sε  is strictly increasing.  Moreover, the function )(sd  is strictly decreasing in skill.  
Hence, the left-hand side of this expression is strictly increasing in skill, implying ŝ  is uniquely determined, and all 
agents with skill levels above ŝ  become scientists.   
 
Proof of the Corollary of Proposition 2: 
Equating (3) and (5), we have  




sdsPsdssP AUNUNUNA  
We begin by proving that UNss ˆˆ > .  Suppose not, such that UNss ˆˆ < , implying )ˆ()ˆ( UNsFsF <  under (A3) and 
)ˆ()ˆ( UNsdsd > .  According to the above expression, we thus must have that )ˆ()),ˆ([ sss UNUN εε < .  Because 
UNss ˆˆ <  and the expected idiosyncratic shock is strictly increasing in skill under (A2), this is a contradiction.  We 
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now prove that ssUN ˆ> .  Suppose not.  Since we established that UNss ˆˆ > , we have )ˆ()ˆ( UNsFsF >  and 
)ˆ()ˆ( UNsdsd < , leading to )ˆ()),ˆ([ sss UNUN εε > .  By hypothesis ssUN ˆ< , which is a contradiction.   
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Since the specified utility function is strictly increasing, an agent with test score t strictly prefers becoming a 








εδδ tPtv A  exceeds w.  Given the 
definition (9), it follows that all agents with test scores above t̂  strictly prefer becoming a scientist instead of a 
production engineer.   
Consider an agent with test score t and skill s who is considering becoming an entrepreneur instead of a scientist.  







εδδ tPutvu A .  Using the results 




−== δεδ tPtxtk A , the expected utility of an entrepreneur with test score t and 
























cu , the expected utility of an 
entrepreneur exceeds the utility of a scientist when 
σσ εσεσ −−−− −>− 1111 )()1(})({)1( tsE .  Using the fact 
that 
δεε ss =)(  and st η= , the inequality becomes )1(1111 )1(}{)1( σδσσ ηεσεσ −−−−− −>− E .  It follows 
that all agents with test scores below sη , where η  is defined by (8), strictly prefer becoming an entrepreneur 
instead of a scientist.  
Now consider an agent with test score t and skill s who is considering becoming an entrepreneur instead of a 








εδδ tPutvu A .  Comparing the expected utility of an entrepreneur with the 
utility of a production engineer, we find that the former exceeds the latter if and only if 
11 )1(11)1)(1(1 )ˆ()1(})({)()1(










cu .  Using 
δεε ss =)(  and st η= , the inequality becomes δδ ηη −− > ts ˆ1 .  This inequality must hold irrespective of 






















s .  From Jensen’s inequality, according to (8), we have that 
1<η ; moreover, by assumption, 10 << δ .  Hence, )()( 12 ss ηη >  for all 
1ˆ −< ηts ; similarly, 
)()( 12 ss ηη <  for all 
1ˆ −> ηts , and the two functions are equal at 1ˆ −ηt .  An agent’s occupation in ),( sη  space 
is thus as shown graphically in Figure 1.   
Proof of Corollary 1 of Proposition 3: 
Let PW denote the occupation of production engineer, S that of scientist, and E that of entrepreneur.  Define )( jPs  
as the probability that an agent with skill s chooses occupation j, for ESPWj ,,= .  Define the functions 
1
1


















s , and note that they are both strictly decreasing in skill s.  Then 
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Proposition 4 implies the following: for 
1ˆ −> ηts , we have ))(()( 2 sTPWPs η= , )(1)( ηTSPs −= , and 
))(()()( 2 sTTEPs ηη −= ; otherwise, we have ))(()( 1 sTPWPs η= , ))((1)( 1 sTSPs η−= , and 
0)( =EPs .  Since T is strictly increasing, it follows that )(PWPs  is strictly decreasing in s over the entire skill 
range ),0[ ∞ ; )(EPs  is strictly increasing for 
1ˆ −> ηts ; and )(SPs  is constant with respect to s for 
1ˆ −> ηts , 
and strictly increasing otherwise. 
Proof of Corollary 2 of Proposition 3: 
Define the function 
1)( −= tssη , which graphically is identical to the curve 11 ˆ)(
−= stsη  depicted in Figure 1.  
Consider the set of agents that obtained the test score t.  The occupation they choose depends on where they lie 
along the curve 
1)( −= tssη .  Suppose we increase the test score t.  This causes the curve 1)( −= tssη  to shift to 
the right and upward.  No agents with test scores below t̂  become scientists, and no agents with test scores above t̂  
become production engineers.  
Proof of Corollary 3 of Proposition 3: 
Consider the first statement.  Inspecting Figure 1, we find that a rise in η  has two effects: it raises the line ηη =  


















s  to the left.  The first effect (in isolation) causes the mass of 
entrepreneurs to rise and that of scientists to fall, while holding constant the mass of production engineers.  The 
second effect (in isolation) causes the mass of entrepreneurs to rise and that of production engineers to fall, while 
holding constant the mass of scientists.  Consider the second statement.  If ε  is distributed uniformly over 






















η .  Holding 10 0 <≤ ε  constant, η  is strictly 
decreasing in σ  over )2,0[  (ignoring the limiting case 1=σ ).  Beyond that range, the solution is imaginary.  
Holding 20 <≤σ  constant, η  is strictly increasing in 0ε  over the entire open unit interval.  Hence, as the 
variance of the idiosyncratic shock falls ( 0ε  rises), or an agent becomes less risk averse (σ  falls), the cutoff η  
rises, as claimed. 
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